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Lecture
Why is it So Hard to Negotiate with the
Russians?*
Eugene V. Rostowt
My assignment is to explain why it is so difficult to negoti-
ate arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. In short, I
am expected to solve Churchill's famous "riddle wrapped in an
enigma"1 within the lecturer's standard fifty minutes - or,
preferably, less. I should start with a disclaimer. One of the best
of our State Department Soviet experts, Ambassador Charles
Bohlen,2 used to say there were two classes of people he knew
were lying - people who said whiskey didn't affect them, and
those who claimed they knew how to negotiate with the Rus-
© 1985 Eugene V. Rostow.
* The third in a series of Dyson Distinguished Lectures was delivered on March 12,
1985. The Dyson Distinguished Lectures Series is made possible by the gift of Charles H.
Dyson through the Dyson Foundation. The purpose of the endowment is to encourage
outstanding scholarly contributions and enrich the academic life of the faculty and
students at the School of Law and Pace University.
t Sterling Professor of Law Emeritus, Yale University; Distinguished Visiting Re-
search Professsor of Law and Diplomacy, National Defense University.
1. Radio broadcast of October 1, 1939, in which Churchill said, "I cannot forecast to
you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."
2. Charles Eustis Bohlen (1904-1974) joined the Foreign Service in 1927 and re-
ceived his early training in Soviet affairs; he served in the Moscow Embassy in 1934-1935
and again from 1938-1941. In the course of his career, Bohlen was Ambassador to the
Soviet Union, France, and the Philippines, and served as counsellor to the Secretary of
State, chiefly as Adviser on Soviet affairs.
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sians. I shall try to carry out my duty tonight with full respect
for Ambassador Bohlen's admonition.
There is a vast and arcane literature on the difficulties of
negotiating with the Soviet Union, and particularly on the diffi-
culties of negotiating arms control agreements.
One branch of that literature concentrates on the Russian
character and personality, and the special pressures on the Rus-
sian personality arising from the nature of the Soviet regime.
Some writers of this school tell us that Russians are inscrutable
Orientals, products of a mysterious culture we can never expect
to understand. Others rely on the wily peasant hypothe-
sis - that, at heart, Soviet diplomats are cunning Russian
peasants whose natural negotiating style is that of a peasant try-
ing to cheat his customers at a country market. Others still, with
varying degrees of learning and insight, cite travellers to Russia
since the sixteenth century who described Russians as inveterate
liars, with a hazy sense at best of the difference between truth
and falsehood. In the late 1940's, Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish
economist and sociologist, predicted that we and the British
would make a mess of our diplomacy with the Russians, because
we would assume that Russians are gentlemen and make agree-
ments which they would have no intention of carrying out.
"What you can't believe," Myrdal said, "is what every Swede
knows in his bones. The Russian culture is not a gentleman
culture."
Another branch of the literature about negotiating with
Russians focuses on our diplomatic experience, especially in the
negotiation of the SALT I and SALT II agreements,' and the
3. SALT (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks) refers to the negotiating process be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union aimed at limiting strategic weapons.
SALT I, the first round of negotiations, began in 1969 and resulted in the signing of the
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) and the In-
terim Offensive Arms Agreement in 1972. In undertaking these agreements, the Soviet
Union and the United States committed themselves to continue active negotiations on
the limitation of strategic offensive weapons and to bring the arms race to an end.
The negotiation of the SALT II agreement began in November, 1972, and
culminated in June, 1979, with the signing of the SALT II documents. The lengthy and
complex SALT II documents include the Treaty text, a Protocol, a summary of agreed
statements and common understandings relating to interpretation of the Treaty, and
reports on the number of weapons in various categories deployed by each side. President
Carter asked the Senate not to give its advice and consent to the ratification of SALT II
on January 3, 1980, after lengthy and controversial hearings had been held by two Sen-
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nuclear arms negotiations between 1981 and 1983. These books
and articles tend to have apocalyptic titles like Cold Dawn,4 En-
dgame,5 Doubletalk,6 and Deadly Gambits.7 Almost without ex-
ception, their thesis is that it is all our fault. The Soviets are
presented as Noble Savages, innocent and rather unsophistica-
ted voyagers from a distant planet which has been overrun innu-
merable times in the course of history by bloodthirsty invaders
from the East, the West, and the South. As a result, we are told,
Russians are preternaturally suspicious of foreigners, but kind
and generous at heart, and eager to reach fair and balanced
agreements with the West. If only we were more sympathetic to
the natural anxieties of the Russians, more tolerant of traits and
habits which writers of this school ascribe to a Russian sense of
inferiority toward the West, and more ingenious and imaginative
as negotiators, we should have long since sealed true detente,
perhaps even genuine peace with the Soviet Union through arms
control agreements which exorcise the nightmare of nuclear war,
and allow the two social systems to " coexist " in peace.
As you will have gathered by now, I am skeptical about both
branches of the literature as guides to our problems of living
with the Russians. There is something to be learned from these
books and articles, but not a great deal. Some are entertaining,
others are dull. Of course the Russian culture is a strong and
distinct entity, not to be confused with the cultures of France,
China, the United States or any other country or groups of
countries. And of course we should do our best to understand
the Russian culture, both for our own sakes, and as preparation
for the essential task of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet
Union in our sense of that slippery term. The Russians are not
savages, noble or otherwise, but a gifted people who have made
an extraordinarily rich contribution to Western literature, art,
music, and learning during the last three centuries. Their moral
and religious life has deep roots, and abiding power. They are no
more addicted than other people to lying, cheating, and like sins;
ate Committees. 38 CONG. Q. 3 (Jan. 5, 1980).
4. JOHN NEWHOUSE, COLD DAWN: THE STORY OF SALT (1973).
5. STROBE TALBOTr, ENDGAME: THE INSIDE STORY OF SALT 11 (1979).
6. GERARD SMITH, DOUBLETALK. THE STORY OF THE FIRST STRATEGIC ARMS LIMIrrA-
TIONS TALKS (1980).
7. STROBE TALBOTT, DEADLY GAMBITS (1984).
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and there are as many ladies and gentlemen among them as is
the case with people of Western Europe and the United States.
No doubt the travellers' tales are true, within the usual limits,
but they only confirm the obvious - that all cultures are differ-
ent, but also have much in common.
I have known Russians all my life, and I have known and
worked with Soviet diplomats for a good many years. Many So-
viet diplomats, like other Russians, are cultivated and agreeable
men and women, good companions and reliable colleagues. So-
viet diplomats are serious professionals - intelligent, well-edu-
cated, and well-trained. A good many share the views one often
finds among Soviet students in this country or in Europe - the
characteristic attitudes of the Russian intelligentsia before 1914
so well described in Fathers and Sons8 and the essays of Sir
Isaiah Berlin.9 The old-fashioned Russian intellectuals did not
suffer from inferiority complexes. Neither does the new crop. On
the contrary, they look down on Western and, particularly on
American intellectuals as badly educated and hopelessly naive.
Governmental policy, however, is not made by people,
whether peasants or intellectuals, but by governments. And the
Soviet Government is an institution of a most particular charac-
ter. It is, of course, a dictatorship controlled by the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, which evolved as a revolutionary and
conspiratorial schismatic group within the Socialist movement of
the last century. Forged in bitter and often violent underground
struggles, its outlook has been and remains that of a guerilla
commando, equally at war with established authority and with
Socialist heterodoxy. It regards itself as the chosen instrument
of the true faith, whose mission is to fulfill the apostolic prophe-
cies of Marx and Lenin. The Party now includes not only the
few who still believe in its professed creed, but also careerists,
power-addicts, thugs, lovers of money and privilege, and other
members of what Djilas0 called the New Class, and Russians
8. IVAN TURGENEV, FATHERS AND SONS (1861) (dealing with nihilist philosophy and
personal and social rebellion).
9. In dealing with the phenomenon of the Russian intelligentsia, English political
scientist Sir Isaiali Berlin was concerned with the social and moral questions which the
intelligentsia posed and the dilemmas that they sought to resolve. ISAIAH BERLIN, Rus-
SIAN THINKERS 114-35 (1978).
10. MILOVAN DJILAS, NEW CLASS (1957). Djilas, a former Yugoslav government and
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call the "Nomeklatura". It is not surprising that a government
dominated by such a group is difficult to deal with. There is no
way of dealing with it unless one understands not only Russian
history and the Russian high culture of Tolstoy, Turgenev, and
Dostoyevsky, but the history of the Soviet Union and the low
culture so brilliantly and powerfully revealed by Solzhenitsyn,
Sinyavsky, and other great Russian prophets of our time.
My answer to the question before us tonight, namely, why is
it so difficult to reach arms control agreements with the Soviet
Union, and particularly agreements about nuclear arms, is that
Soviet and Western objectives in these negotiations are incom-
patible. The obstacles to agreements we could and should accept
are not based on misunderstandings and cannot be cured by dia-
logue, vodka, ingenuity in drafting, or prolonged walks in the
woods. I strongly favor civil and companionable relations be-
tween the Soviet and Western citizens at many levels, personal
and official. Over the years I have done my best to further the
national interests of the United States by consuming vast
amounts of food and drink with Soviet guests, hosts, and other
interlocutors. Such contacts are educational and worthwhile, but
we should never confuse ourselves by supposing that they lead
to peace. Soviet and American officials understand each other's
government about as well as people ever understand the dynam-
ics of a foreign society and government - that is to say, not
very well. What has made arms control agreements and the arms
control process so problematical, however, is far deeper and
more intractable than simple ignorance, the occasional lunacy of
American bureaucracy or politics, and the prevalence of folly, es-
pecially in the government of the United States.
Without ever being explicit about it, Soviet diplomats ex-
pect their opposite numbers to understand the circumstances
under which Soviet officials live and work. If a Western negotia-
tor has a reasonable familiarity with Russian culture, a clear
sense of the nature of Soviet society, and a modicum of empa-
thy, negotiating with Soviet diplomats is not notably more diffi-
cult than other forms of serious negotiation. In cases where the
Communist party official, was a life-long Communist whose systematic and Marxian cri-
tique of Soviet society and party officials as a new ruling class led to years of
imprisonment.
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interests of the Soviet Union and the United States are identi-
cal, or close to being identical, it is often easy to reach an agree-
ment. If the gap between the two sides is not great, and the So-
viet stake in having an agreement is strong, it is usually not too
difficult to find an accommodation. For example, it is not hard
to sell grain to the Soviet Union when it wants to buy grain, or
to find common ground on the basic ideas of the law of the sea,
since both the Soviet Union and the United States are maritime
powers and have the same opinions about the international
character of straits and canals. The Non-Proliferation Treaty of
196711 was quickly achieved, because both sides have the same
interest in keeping the nuclear club small, or at least they both
think they do. But where the subject matter of the negotiation
touches the fundamental purposes of Soviet foreign policy, the
negotiating problem is altogether different, and has thus far
proved insoluble. It is, in fact, a misnomer to call such an en-
counter a negotiation in any sense. It is a problem in conflict,
and can be resolved only by deploying the manifest reality of
unacceptable risk. On issues such as these, issues which touch
the nerve of sovereignty, negotiating with the Soviet Union is a
bracing sport - very bracing indeed. Sir William Hayter, who
served with distinction as British Ambassador to Moscow, once
remarked that negotiating with the Soviet Union on topics of
this order was like dealing with a recalcitrant vending machine.
Sometimes it helped to put in another coin. Occasionally, it was
useful to shake the machine, or to kick it. But the one procedure
which never did any good was to talk to it. As Dean Acheson12
once said, one should never negotiate with the Soviet Union un-
less one is willing to come home without an agreement.
11. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been signed by more than 110 coun-
tries. Under its terms, nations that do not already have nuclear weapons promise not to
try to develop them. In return, those nations get help from countries like the United
States and the Soviet Union in setting up nuclear plants for peaceful purposes.
12. Dean Acheson (1893-1971) served as Secretary of State from 1949 to 1953 as well
as advisor to four Presidents. Following World War II, he was the principal creator of
U.S. foreign policy, helping to create the NATO alliance in opposition to the Soviet
Union and other communist nations.
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II.
This is an aspect of modern life we find extremely difficult
to accept. For a number of reasons, many people in the West,
and more particularly in the United States, Canada, Great Brit-
ain, Scandinavia, and the Netherlands have a strong emotional
need to resist the obvious fact that the Soviet Union and the
United States have completely different objectives in foreign
policy and, therefore, completely different objectives in arms
control negotiations. The United States and its allies are not in-
terested in conquest, but in security. Their ambition is to
achieve an open state system of cooperating free states, living in
accordance with the rules of international law. The Soviet
Union, however, is embarked on a policy of indefinite expansion
fuelled by the practice of open aggression. The Western nations
look to their nuclear arsenals as an aspect of defense, a deterrent
against aggression, and to arms control agreements as an assur-
ance of the capacity of each side to sustain deterrence, predict-
ability, and stability in a changing military environment - in
short, as a means of deterring aggression by achieving and main-
taining nuclear stalemate. For the Soviet Union, on the other
hand, the goal of their nuclear arsenal is to demonstrate a plau-
sible first strike capacity. Without ever firing a nuclear weapon,
they are convinced they could use such an arsenal as the ulti-
mate tool of aggression - as an intimidating sanction behind
their program of indefinite expansion preventing any American
response to their aggressive use of conventional force, terrorism,
and subversion against Third World countries, Communist
countries, and peripheral members of the Western camp. For
Soviet diplomacy, therefore, the goal of nuclear arms negotia-
tions is to make it possible for the Soviet Union to enhance and
consolidate its first strike capacity, and to deny the United
States a deterrent capacity based on the threat of retaliation.
Facing such a challenge, they believe, the United States would
have no choice but to remain neutral. The Soviet leaders con-
duct their campaign of expansion with some prudence, so as not
to arouse us abruptly. But their psychology is that of men at
war.
The earnest Western campaigners for unilateral Western
disarmament deny these features of reality. They prefer to talk
about the tension between the Soviet Union and the United
1985]
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States as "great power rivalry" based on "mutual mistrust," and
pass resolutions urging Soviet-American summit meetings.
It is seriously misleading to speak of the Soviet-American
relationship as if it were a normal and inevitable feature of in-
ternational politics like the rivalry of the two biggest boys in a
school playground at recess. Such a view puts the two countries
on the same moral plane and treats their interests as equally
legitimate. But the aggressor and his victim do not stand on the
same moral, political, and legal plane. Their interests are not
equally legitimate. And as a practical matter, the refusal to con-
front the profound differences between the foreign policies of
the United States and the Soviet Union leads to all sorts of error
and ndivet6 in the formulation of Western policies. As President
Johnson once said about a Solon of his day, "that fellow would
find an excuse for them if they landed in Mexico."
The nature of the tension between the Soviet Union and the
rest of the world is a question with which humanity has been
struggling since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.13 It is an in-
tensely troubling question for people of the Western tradition,
involving passionate loyalties, poignant memories, and noble
dreams. But the answer to the question is no longer in doubt.
The Soviet Union is in the imperial mood of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, as a distinguished British historian has
remarked - the imperial mood which the peoples and govern-
ments of the West have long since given up with relief. And the
Soviet thrust for empire now threatens the state system which
has evolved through trial and error since the end of the Napole-
onic Wars. The state system of the nineteenth century collapsed
in 1914 and was rebuilt within the framework of the League of
Nations 14 after the First World War; it collapsed again in the
1930's, and was again reformed and reestablished, this time
13. The "Great October Revolution" occurred on November 8, 1917, when Bolshe-
vik-led soldiers stormed the weakly defended Winter Palace in Petrograd; the violent
upheaval overthrew the Czarist government and was the beginning of the Russian
Revolution.
14. The purpose of the League of Nations, as conceived by Woodrow Wilson, was to
"afford mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and
small states alike." Address of President Woodrow Wilson, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. (January
18, 1918).
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under the Charter of the United Nations in 1945.11 Now the
Charter is going the way of the Covenant of the League.
The contemporary state system is on a different scale from
the Eurocentered system of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. The old European Empires, save only the Russian,
have dissolved into nearly 100 independent states. Rule by a
Communist Party, established in Russia in 1917, has now been
extended to a dozen or more states, and the Soviet Union is pur-
suing an active program of expansion. The vast realm of Islam is
undergoing transformations peculiar to itself. And the United
States, China, and Japan have emerged as major participants
both in world politics and in the affairs of the integrated and
progressive capitalist world economy. It is no wonder that the
state system has been buffeted by the strains of adapting to
these immense flows of change. The process of adaptation has
been conducted with considerable success, but it is now
threatened by the accelerating spread of the practice of
aggression.
The root of the matter is that the Soviet Union has never
accepted Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter"6 as applica-
ble to it. That Article categorically condemns the international
use of force - "force," it should be noted, not "armed force"
alone - against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of a state, except where justified by the inherent and his-
toric right of individual or collective self-defense, which is not
qualified in any way by the Charter.
The enforcement of these rules is the chief function of the
Security Council, 17 which, on paper at least, has far more au-
thority than any institution of the League. Its nominal power
recalls that which Palmerston, Disraeli, and Bismarck exercised
in fact during some of the diplomatic Congresses of the nine-
15. The Charter of the United Nations also provides for the "sovereign equality of
all its Members." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1; the one exception to this is the Security
Council. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
16. "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art.
2, para. 4.
17. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 23-54, 75-85, for specific powers granted to the Security
Council for the discharge of their duties.
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teenth century: the power to guide, direct, limit, cajole, concili-
ate, and, if necessary, to command and dispose of controversies
which threaten the peace.
From the beginning of the Charter era, the Soviet Union
has claimed for itself - and only for itself - the privilege of
using force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of states which are not governed by socialist regimes, and
indeed of using force even against socialist states if they are
under the control of socialist heretics, revisionists, or schismat-
ics, or if they show dangerous signs of backsliding to capitalism
or democracy. One of the most familiar Soviet tactics of aggres-
sion is the international use of force in support of insurrections
within a state - a violation of state sovereignty that interna-
tional law has condemned as war for centuries.
Since 1945, this feature of the political landscape is so fa-
miliar that we take it to be the order of nature, and assume that
it has somehow been legitimized. But the special privilege of the
Soviet Union to commit aggression at will cannot be legitimized
under the Charter of the United Nations. Whether practiced by
the Soviet Union or by any other state, aggression - including
the international use of force to support revolutionary move-
ments - violates the basic rule of the Charter system: the in-
tegrity of states.
When pressed, Soviet diplomats or scholars say that for the
Motherland of Socialism to obey Article 2(4) would be to give up
its nature as a society and a state. To this, the only answer an
American can offer is that the Soviet Union can preach the gos-
pel of communism as much as it likes, but that in the nature of
the state system, it cannot be allowed to propagate its faith with
a sword.
The Soviet program of expansion, sedulously pursued since
1945, has gone too far. It threatens the most fundamental secur-
ity interest of all other states - their interest in the world bal-
ance of power - and has, therefore, touched nerves of great
sensitivity in countries as diverse as China, Japan, Egypt, the
NATO countries, and the small nations of Southeast Asia. Un-
less the policy of Soviet expansion is stopped - and stopped
soon - it will destroy the last vestiges of the rule against ag-
gression that the world has struggled so hard and so long to es-
tablish. The state system cannot live by a double standard. Na-
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tions do not stand idly by and allow themselves to be nibbled to
death, as Adlai Stevenson remarked a generation ago. The dis-
appearance of the rule against aggression is not a result the
Western nations want. Indeed, it is a result they fear pro-
foundly. But it will come about, inevitably, if the Soviet Union
continues on its present course.
Nonetheless, the Soviet program of expansion continues un-
abated. Indeed it has been gaining in momentum as the Soviet
armed forces have grown at an astonishing rate, both in conven-
tional and in nuclear power. Despite the rearmament efforts of
the Western powers during the last six or seven years, the Soviet
Union continues to widen its lead over the United States and its
allies in most of the crucial components of military power, and
to reduce the few military advantages the United States still
possesses.
III.
What is the purpose of the Soviet Union's prodigious mili-
tary buildup? Can it be explained or excused as a defensive re-
sponse to an exaggerated concern for security? Does it make
conventional or nuclear war, inevitable?
As noted earlier, the goal of Soviet foreign policy is alto-
gether different from that of the United States. The United
States and the other Western states seek to restore a state sys-
tem governed by the rules and principles of the United Nations
Charter - a state system resting on a stable balance of power,
capable of peaceful change, and scrupulous in its respect for the
territorial integrity and the political independence of all states,
whatever their social systems. So far as nuclear weapons are con-
cerned, the United States has actively pursued policies that
would bring nuclear technology under close international con-
trol, starting with the proposal of the Baruch Plan in 1946, and
prevent the use of nuclear weapons altogether."8
18. The Baruch Plan, named for Bernard M. Baruch, the first American delegate to
the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations, was considered bold because of
the scope of its proposals. The plan provided for close international control of the entire
field of atomic development all the way back to the mines. J.A. SCHWARTZ, THE SPECULA-
TOR 490-507 (1981); M.V. ROSENBLOOM, BERNARD BARUCH AND A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY
257-91 (1953); B. BARUCH, THE PUBLIC YEARs 357-82 (1960).
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The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has long been engaged
in a program of indefinite expansion based on the aggressive use
of military power as an instrument of national policy. Conven-
tional forces, proxy forces, terrorists, guerillas, and subversion
are the direct agents used to accomplish this end. The Soviet
Union relies on the silent power of its nuclear arsenal to deter
any Western response to aggression carried out by such means.
The Soviet process of expansion, which has imposed a grow-
ing pressure on the state system since 1945, is the underlying
cause of the tension between the Soviet Union and the United
States. The arms race, the difficulties of nuclear arms negotia-
tion, and many other disturbing phenomena of modern world
politics are symptoms and consequences of that underlying
cause. For many years, the United States has led coalitions of
like-minded states to deter, contain, and if necessary to defeat
the expansion of Soviet power brought about by the aggressive
use of force. The effectiveness of those policies was weakened by
the tragic experience of Korea and Vietnam. It is now being
weakened by another influence - that of Soviet nuclear superi-
ority in ground based ballistic missiles, the most accurate and
devastating nuclear weapons, and the ones least vulnera-
ble - so far - to any weapons of defense.
IV.
We have not yet fully grasped the nature of Soviet nuclear
strategy. The Soviet Union recognizes the profound change
which the nuclear weapon has brought about in the art of war,
and, therefore, in world politics. It realizes that, for all practical
purposes, Soviet nuclear weapons cannot be fired while the
United States retains a convincing retaliatory capacity. It, there-
fore, perceives the nuclear weapon as primarily a political, not a
military instrument. The Soviet leaders are not building their
enormous nuclear forces in order to use them in a nuclear war.
On the contrary, they are attempting to use them as the key
element of a muscular diplomacy designed to exploit nuclear
fear as an influence on Western policy. The Soviet government
acts on the assumption that if it acquires a convincing first
strike capability against the United States, American security
guarantees will lose all their deterrent credibility, and the
United States will retreat into isolation and neutrality. As a re-
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sult the Soviet Union will dominate the Eurasian heartland
without firing a shot, and, therefore, dominate Africa, the Eura-
sian coastlands, and islands like Japan, Great Britain, and the
United States as well. People have an altogether reasonable hor-
ror of nuclear war; in the democratic world, that horror has the
potential of becoming an overwhelming political force. To help
make that potentiality real, the Soviet Union is conducting a
campaign based on three elements: the creation of a nuclear ar-
senal that would make a preemptive Soviet first strike plausible;
the maintenance of a public image of mindless ferocity, which
would reinforce the plausibility of such a threat; and propa-
ganda designed to transform nuclear concern into panic, and
thus keep the West from taking the peaceful and effective coun-
termeasures which are altogether within its power.
No one can guarantee that the taboo against the use of nu-
clear weapons which has lasted since 1945 will continue indefi-
nitely. For the moment, at least, we can say that the risks of
such a catastrophe are relatively low, and will remain low so long
as two conditions are satisfied: first, that the United States re-
tain an adequate nuclear deterrent and the solidarity of its alli-
ance system; and second, that the world prevent widespread nu-
clear proliferation, especially to irrational political leaders.
General nuclear proliferation would make world politics unpre-
dictably volatile.
The major risk of nuclear war is through the escalation of
conventional war. There can be no assurance that the fallible
human beings who control both conventional and nuclear weap-
ons could refrain indefinitely from using nuclear weapons under
the stress of battle. It follows, therefore, that it will be impossi-
ble to eliminate the risk of nuclear war without restoring the
viability of the state system, and enforcing its most important
rule - the rule against aggression.
But the state system reestablished in 1945 under the Char-
ter of the United Nations is crumbling towards anarchy. If we
allow that system to disintegrate much further, the risk of gen-
eral war will correspondingly increase. That risk could increase
also if the shadowy rules of prudence, which have somewhat re-
strained Soviet and American behavior towards each other since
1945, become altogether ineffective.
These rules of prudence emerged early in the history of the
1985]
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Cold War, as it became obvious that the Soviet Union was un-
willing to discuss or to modify its policies of expansion. The
West correspondingly decided to pursue the course of containing
and deterring Soviet aggression, and defeating it when neces-
sary, rather than eliminating the Soviet Union's capacity to
commit aggression in a fundamental way'
Perhaps the most basic of these rules is that the armed
forces of each side not fire at the armed forces of the other. The
only exceptions to that rule so far have been the Cuban Missile
Crisis of 1962, when the United States boarded and turned back
a Soviet vessel bound for Cuba, and the recent murder of Major
Nicholson by Soviet soldiers near Potsdam in East Germany.1"
The Soviet government did not use armed force to interfere with
the Allied Airlift which saved Berlin in the 1940's, or the flow of
American and Allied supplies and troops to Korea and Vietnam.
In the West, some students and officials thought that there
would be a second tacit rule of prudence for the conduct of the
Cold War - that each side would respect certain special secur-
ity interests of the other. Thus the West has refrained from in-
terfering with the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.
It soon became clear, however, that the Soviet Union would not
correspondingly refrain from attempts to take over Greece,
Cuba, Iran, Turkey, and other countries we had supposed to be
in the Western "sphere of influence."
Ever since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the United
States has pressed the Soviet Union to accept rules that could
constitute a third category of a Soviet-American code of pru-
dence - rules that might ensure the deterrent stability of the
Soviet-American nuclear balance. To our way of thinking, the
Cuban Missile Crisis revealed the explosive potentialities of nu-
clear anxiety, and demonstrated the potential importance of un-
19. On March 24, 1985, Major Arthur Nicholson became the first uniformed Ameri-
can soldier to be killed by Soviet gunfire in more than two decades. The Major had the
legal authority to operate behind enemy lines as part of a little-known 14-member U.S.
liaison mission in Potsdam that monitors troop movements in East Germany. He had
ventured too close to a restricted area to photograph the interior of a shed containing
Soviet military equipment; a Soviet sentry fired three shots, one of which hit Nicholson
in the chest. The Soviet solders on the scene did not bring medical help to Major Nichol-
son nor did they allow his driver to give him first-aid. The Superpowers; A Time of
Testing, NEWSWEEK Apr. 8, 1985 at 20-22; Cat-and-Mouse Game That Turned Deadly,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 8, 1985 at 13.
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derstandings or agreements that might minimize uncertainty on
each side about the nuclear forces and nuclear intentions of the
other. Despite all the evidence, we have clung to the illusion that
the Soviet goal in these negotiations was the same as our own.
Nuclear weapons have not been fired in war since 1945. The
specter of nuclear war does not yet significantly inhibit the phe-
nomenon of conventional and guerilla war in many parts of the
Third World, which has suffered, and is suffering, terrible injury
as a consequence. The Soviet Union, however, has refrained
from directly attacking Western Europe, Japan, and other mani-
festly fundamental security interests of the United States, in
part, surely because of the paralyzing uncertainty about the pos-
sibility of an American nuclear response. Nuclear warfare among
the industrialized nations is unlikely if the United States retains
a credible retaliatory capability as a deterrent; in the past, at
least, the United States has used nuclear hints to bring wars in
the Third World to a halt - in Korea, for example, and in the
October, 1973, Middle Eastern War, where an American alert
stopped Soviet intervention.
The arms control negotiations in Geneva bring out the dif-
ferences between Soviet and American doctrines with respect to
the possible use of nuclear weapons, and Soviet and American
objectives in the negotiations. The key issue in this phase of the
negotiations is the growing lead in ground-based ballistic mis-
siles that we have foolishly allowed the Soviet Union to achieve
since 1972. In 1972, the Soviet Union and the United States
were approximately equal in the number of warheads on ground-
based intercontinental ballistic missles (ICBM), and there was
no doubt about the retaliatory capacity of the United States.
Today the Soviet lead is at least 3.5 to 1 with respect to war-
heads on ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and
over 4 to 1 in throw weight, the carrying capacity of the vehicles.
In addition, the Soviet Union has a near monopoly in intermedi-
ate range missiles. These weapons present a growing threat to
Western Europe, Japan, China, and the Middle East at a time of
increasing doubt about America's capacity to defend its interest
in those areas with nuclear weapons.
The immediate negotiating goal of the Soviet Union in the
nuclear arms negotiations is to achieve agreements which allow
it to maintain and strengthen its lead in intermediate range and
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intercontinental ground-based ballistic missiles, and impose
crippling limits on our nuclear arsenal. The American goal con-
tinues to be the goal of equal limits that could promote political
stability.
The Soviet reasoning is brutally simple.
As the Scowcroft Commission ° pointed out, "The Sovi-
ets.. .now probably possess the necessary combination of ICBM
numbers, reliability, accuracy, and warhead yield to destroy al-
most all of the 1,047 U.S. ICBM silos, using only a portion of
their own ICBM force." A Soviet first-strike capability is im-
plicit in this Soviet posture - its ability to destroy our ICBM
force, our planes on the ground, and our submarines in port with
twenty-five or thirty percent of its ICBM force. When the Soviet
Union's near monopoly of intermediate range ground-based bal-
listic missiles is taken into account, as it should be, the position
of the United States becomes even worse. The plain fact now is
that the Soviets have the capability to destroy a range of hard-
ened military targets, and we do not. According to the Scowcroft
Commission Report, this "one-sided strategic advantage" in
ground-based ballistic missiles "casts a shadow over the calculus
of Soviet risk taking at every level of confrontation with the
West." We cannot safely permit that imbalance to continue. As
the Scowcroft Commission said, it must "be redressed
promptly." No President of the United States should ever be
confronted with the choice between nuclear war and the aban-
donment of vital national security interests.
A Soviet first-strike capability is the heart of the Soviet
plan to separate the United States from its allies in Europe,
Asia, and the Middle East by means of political pressure. Stabil-
ity, predictability, and deterrence cannot be restored until the
Soviet first-strike capability is eliminated.
There are only three ways in which that goal can
20. On January 3, 1983, President Reagan appointed a committee to recommend
new deployment options for the MX missiles after Congress rejected the administration's
proposal to cluster the missiles together in hardened silos in the so-called "dense pack"
basing system. Brent Scowcroft, a retired Air Force General who had served as National
Security Advisor to former President Gerald Ford, was named as chairman of the panel.
In contrast to earlier panels formed to evaluate MX basing modes, the new committee
was composed largely of former military and government leaders rather than scientific
and technical experts.
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be achieved: (1) a crash American building program: MX,
Midgetman, cruise missiles, Pershing II, and all; (2) the develop-
ment of defensive weapons which might transform the nuclear
equation by requiring eighty or ninety percent of the Soviet nu-
clear force to execute a first strike, rather than the twenty-five
or thirty percent now required; or (3) an arms agreement with
the Soviet Union based on the principle of Soviet-American de-
terrent retaliatory equality - the only kind of arms agreement
which could preserve an unchallengeable American capacity to
prevent Soviet nuclear blackmail of its national security
interests.
The only significant difference between the Soviet Union
and the United States in the Geneva nuclear arms talks between
1981 and 1983 concerned this crucial issue - Soviet-American
equality. The United States pressed for agreements based on
that principle; the Soviets adamantly refused, holding out for
what they called "equality and equal security," an Aesopian
phrase which would entitle them to a force equal to the sum of
all the other nuclear forces in the world. To put the matter
bluntly, the Soviet goal in the negotiations was to induce the
United States to acknowledge the Soviet Union's "right" to nu-
clear superiority. That is why the Soviets pressed for the inclu-
sion of British and French forces in the INF2  talks, although
they know that those forces are no threat to the far superior
Soviet arsenal, but exist for quite different national purposes.
They also held out for agreements based on the principle of
equal reduction, not reduction to equal levels, which was the ba-
sis for the 1922 Washington naval agreements.22 The Soviet ap-
proach in the INF21 and START2 4 negotiations would make the
crucial Soviet advantage in ground-based ballistic missiles even
bigger and more intimidating than it is now.
V.
The United States does not have much time to restore the
nuclear balance on which the possibility of our having an effec-
21. Intermediate Nuclear Force.
22. Naval Armament Limitation, Feb. 6, 1922, 43 Stat. 1655, T.S. No. 671.
23. See supra note 21.
24. Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.
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tive foreign policy depends. One of the most promising ways in
which we would pursue that goal is to explore the defensive
technologies which might significantly diminish the capabilities
of the Soviet missile force, and, therefore, begin a major shift in
Western policy from deterrence through the threat of massive
nuclear retaliation to deterrence through effective defense
against nuclear weapons. This is the purpose of the Strategic
Defense Initiative announced by President Reagan in 1983.
President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (hereinafter
referred to as SDI) is a carefully considered and intellectually
sound attempt to escape from the terrible dilemma of nuclear
deterrence. Deterrence through the threat of nuclear annihila-
tion has always been morally abhorrent. Moreoever, it is now of
declining practical utility as well, in view of the changes in the
Soviet-American nuclear balance since 1972. SDI is the most
promising and most idealistic nuclear initiative since the Baruch
Plan was proposed by President Truman nearly forty years ago.
Both for Americans and for their allies and adversaries, SDI
bristles with difficult problems that will take time, patience, ex-
tended analysis and consultation to resolve constructively. In
addition, like every other major revolution, SDI has stirred up a
flurry of resistance among those who resent any change in the
comfortable and familiar universe of thought to which they have
become accustomed.
The first thing to be said about SDI is that it is misnamed.
As Professor Teller2 5 has pointed out, it should have been called
the Strategic Defense Response, because the Soviet Union has
spent more money on strategic defense since 1972, when the
ABM Treaty was signed and ratified, than on offensive nuclear
weapons. The United States, on the contrary, has done only
minimal research in the field since 1972 and has fallen far be-
hind the Soviet Union. President Reagan's decision to accelerate
our research program in strategic defense was, therefore, inevita-
ble, like President Franklin Roosevelt's decision to build an
25. American physicist, Edward Teller, is generally credited with the development
of the world's first thermonuclear weapon, the hydrogen bomb. He has been recognized
for his significant contributions to the development, use, and control of nuclear energy.
26. Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United States-
U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503. See also supra note 3 and accompanying
text.
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atomic bomb27 after a group of scientists told him that Hitler
was already attempting to do so.
Second, as the Administration fully recognizes, even if the
research effort should prove to be successful, the potential re-
sults of SDI will take years to realize. For the indefinite future,
therefore, defensive weapons should be considered within the
present framework of deterrence through the threat of retalia-
tion. They should be considered as an alternative to a massive
build-up of offensive weapons required to restore and reinforce
our policy of deterrence. As Ambassador Nitze2 8 has said,
The present situation - in which the threat of massive nuclear
retaliation is the ultimate sanction, the key element of deterrence,
and, thus, the basis for security and peace - is unsatisfactory. It
has kept the peace for forty years, but the potential costs of a
breakdown are immense and, because of continuing massive So-
viet deployments of both offensive and defensive weaponry, are
not becoming less. If we can, we must find a more reliable basis
for security and for peace.
This concern prompted the President's decision to proceed
with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). He has directed the
scientific community to determine if new cost-effective defensive
technologies are feasible which could be introduced into force
structures so as to produce a more stable strategic relationship.
We envisage, if that search is successful, a cooperative effort with
the Soviet Union, hopefully leading to an agreed transition to-
wards effective non-nuclear defenses that might make possible
the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.2
27. With the discovery of nuclear fission in 1939, it became clear to scientists that
certain radioactive materials could be used to make a bomb of unprecedented power.
President Franklin Roosevelt created a committee to investigate the possibility. Progress
was slow until mid-1942 when the project was placed under U.S. Army control. The en-
tire development effort was ultimately designated the Manhattan Project. Several large
research and development facilities were established for the project. The project's scien-
tists and engineers developed an experimental atomic bomb which was detonated on
July 16, 1945.
28. Paul Henry Nitze, formerly Deputy Secretary of Defense, was a member of the
U.S. Delegation to the SALT talks from 1969 to 1974. Starting in 1981, he led the Dele-
gation to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations with Russia.
29. Address by Paul H. Nitze, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of
State for Arms Reduction Negotiations, Philadelphia World Affairs Council (Feb. 20,
1985), reprinted in OFF. oF PuB. Com., BUREAU OF PUB. AFF., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CUR-
RENT POL'Y No. 657 (1985).
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Thus for the immediate future the strategic problem is ex-
actly the same as that during the negotiation of SALT I: to
achieve nuclear stability by stabilizing the relationship between
offensive and defensive arms. In the early 1970's, the primary
Soviet concern was to suppress what they thought was an Amer-
ican lead in anti-ballistic missiles (ABM's). The Soviet Union
accepted the Five-Year Interim Agreement on Offensive Weap-
ons of 197230 only when the United States made it clear that it
would not agree to the ABM Treaty without the Interim Agree-
ment. Even when the Interim Agreement was signed, the United
States issued a formal statement, declaring that the supreme se-
curity interests of the nation would be engaged if the Soviet
Union failed to agree to the permanent regulation of offensive
weapons. In such an event, we said, the ABM Treaty would be
abrogated.
There has been grave and altogether legitimate concern
about SDI among our allies and other nations whose security de-
pends ultimately on the American nuclear guaranty. They can-
not help wondering whether the United States is seeking to im-
munize itself from the nuclear plague, and whether effective
American ballistic missile defenses would make the American
nuclear umbrella incredible as a protection for any American in-
terests beyond the territories of the United States. By helping to
annul the Soviet Union's present first-strike capacity, SDI, if
successful, should have precisely the opposite effect. It would
thus restore the diminishing credibility of America's promise to
retaliate with nuclear weapons in the event of Soviet aggression
against vital American interests. The fear, however, is natural. It
should be taken seriously, and I trust that the Administration
will take it seriously, both through extended consultations and
through its offer to make the entire program cooperative.
Some students of the subject raise the question whether the
development of Soviet and American defenses would not drive
nuclear deterrence back to the even worse form of Mutual As-
sured Destruction. The question is an important and difficult
one, and will have to be met, especially as we examine the cost
effectiveness of various alternatives offered by the emerging
30. This interim agreement was the result of SALT I negotiations. See supra note 3
and accompanying text.
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technology. The dilemma these analysts pose cannot be avoided.
It would be even worse, however, if we continued to allow the
Soviet Union a free field in developing and deploying ballistic
missile defenses. The problem is simply one of many created by
the implacable development of technology.
Another Allied concern is whether the development of nu-
clear defenses would reduce the significance of the independent
British and French nuclear forces, or the emergence of Europe
as a nuclear political entity.
Again, the answer is that if SDI develops as a cooperative
project involving most of our allies, the resulting defenses should
enhance the deterrent utility of the British and French forces as
well as those of the United States. At the present time, the cred-
ibility of the British and French forces is low vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union because of the disparity of numbers. If the American nu-
clear arsenal were neutralized, could the threat to use British
and French forces against the Soviet Union significantly influ-
ence Soviet decision making since the USSR could retaliate with
overwhelming power after any such attack? A successful Allied
SDI program could only increase the weight of the British and
French forces in world politics.
President Reagan has been ridiculed, and attacked politi-
cally, for proposing to cooperate with the Soviet Union in sup-
pressing the nuclear weapon altogether. I, for one, strongly sup-
port President Reagan's proposal, however Utopian it may seem
today. The nuclear arms race has become an insanity, threaten-
ing civilization itself. It can be stopped only by cooperative ef-
forts involving the two nuclear super-powers and the other key
nations of the world. The hope behind SDI is that the develop-
ment of technology will convince the leaders of the Soviet Union
that the nuclear equation has become so complex, and contains
so many and such mysterious variables, that it can be managed
only by the joint efforts of the Soviet Union and the United
States in the first instance, and by the major powers of the
world ultimately.
A corollary of this thesis should be noted carefully. Cooper-
ative methods for managing the nuclear equation would have to
be matched by a Soviet commitment to abide by the rules of the
Charter of the United Nations regarding the international use of
force. There is no use in having even a good agreement about
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nuclear arms if its main effect would be to make the world safe
for Soviet aggression achieved by the use of non-nuclear forces.
VI.
The nuclear weapon is transforming the horizons of world
politics. It offers hideous prospects and glorious ones as well.
The Soviet Union is attempting to use the nuclear weapon as a
magic tool for achieving world domination without war. The
United States is trying to maintain the system of deterrence and
containment which has been the key idea of Western foreign
policy since President Truman's time. Beyond that interim goal,
America has never stopped trying to persuade the Soviet Union
that the terrors of nuclear weapons leave nations no alternative
but peace.
As the accelerating pressure of Soviet expansion increases
the vulnerability of the state system and of the legal norms on
which it purports to rest, the world is being forced most reluc-
tantly to confront the nightmare of anarchy. For the first time in
many years, scholars, citizens, and politicians alike are beginning
to think and talk and write about the problem of order and the
functions of law in international society.
Many students of the problem are recommending that the
United States retreat from the policies and commitments made
during the last forty years, pull our troops, fleets, and airforces
out of Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Far East and hunker
down at home, as if that option were available to us. They have
embraced the illusion that the state system would survive, more
or less, as we know it, if we attempted to withdraw to neutrality
and isolation as we did in 1919, or to draw a defense line around
the industrial democracies, and let the rest of the world go hang.
These approaches to foreign policy would be suicidal for the
United States, and would almost certainly guarantee devastating
war. In the turbulent, contracting, and interdependent world of
the late twentieth century, our national security interests, in the
most fundamental sense, give us no real choice. The survival of
the United States as a polity, and of America as an ideal for
humanity, require us to support the achievement of the state
system guided by the United Nations Charter. We and the like-
minded nations of the world have more than enough power and
potential power to fulfill that policy without war. What is re-
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quired is simple, but not easy: thought and the will to live by the
consequences of our thought.
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